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Abstract
In 1993, the State of Iowa, through waivers, implemented reforms to its welfare program
creating the Family Investment program (FIP), a program similar to the Federal Temporary As-
sistance to Needy Families (TANF) program created in 1996. This paper examines the experi-
ences of individuals and families who left FIP during the initial years. The program is designed
to help FIP recipients achieve economic self-sufficiency. The analysis of linked state adminis-
trative record data and other local data shows that the Iowa experience has been relatively suc-
cessful in supporting the transition of those leaving FIP. Almost three fourths of those leaving
the program remained off for at least 12 months. Higher wage and child support collections
were important factors in determining who would leave the program and their ability to stay off
of public assistance. The food stamp program functions as a safety net and is an important in-
come source for those who leave FIP. The success of moving people out of FIP in the long run
requires finding low-income individuals a stable job and higher paid work.
Key words: child support, social assistance programs, welfare reform
INNOVATION AT THE STATE LEVEL:
INITIAL EFFECTS OF WELFARE REFORM IN IOWA
Under the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA)
of 1996, federal welfare policy, and linkages among social assistance programs and policies,
changed significantly. The changes of 1996, however, began earlier in several states. In 1993,
the State of Iowa, through waivers, implemented reforms creating the Family Investment Pro-
gram (FIP), a program similar to the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) program
created under PRWORA. The Family Investment Program’s goals of helping program recipi-
ents leave poverty and become self-supporting parallel the intent of TANF and PRWORA
(Holcomb et al., 1998; Iowa Department of Human Services, 1996). FIP merged and coordi-
nated several existing programs and tied support for job training, education, child care, and
transportation more directly to income transfers. The reforms were designed to encourage and
require welfare recipients to make changes toward achieving self-sufficiency. Iowa has had to
change FIP very little to meet current federal guidelines. Thus, the experience in Iowa provides
over five years under a program with rules and incentives similar to those instituted nationwide
only recently.
This paper examines the experiences of individuals and families who leave FIP. Specifi-
cally, we explore why some low income households successfully leave public assistance while
others who leave later return. The analysis makes use of a unique data set comprised of linked
state administrative records, and provides new and important information about the effects of
early welfare reform efforts in one state: Iowa. The research has three specific objectives. First,
we examine the characteristics of FIP program participants and those leaving the program.
Characteristics are compared across time periods. Second, we explore the role of employment,
earnings, and other support such as Food Stamps, Medicaid, and child support for those who
leave FIP. Have these roles changed over time? Third, we consider reasons for recidivism
among FIP leavers over time. The analysis provides evidence on the effects of changes in
Iowa’s welfare programs. It will help policymakers as well as advocates of those affected by
the changes to better understand the impact of the reforms on low income households.
8 / Keng, Garasky, and Jensen
The paper consists of five sections. The first reviews the welfare reform and implementa-
tion under way in Iowa, and provides background information on the cross-program linkages.
Section two describes the state data linked across programs; three provides methods used in the
analysis and approaches taken to address specific measurement issues; and four presents the re-
sults in terms of program effectiveness in moving families off welfare. We conclude with a dis-
cussion of how low income families and individuals will likely be affected by the new welfare
program changes.
Background
The welfare caseload in Iowa began to decline within a year after FIP replaced the Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program on October 1, 1993. Most FIP recipients
are required to complete a Family Investment Agreement (FIA), a contract between the FIP re-
cipient and the State of Iowa. The FIA spells out activities related to moving toward self-
sufficiency in which the FIP recipient must participate (e.g. orientation and assessment, job-
seeking skills and job search, classroom training), and the amount of time it will take the recipi-
ent to become self-supporting and leave FIP assistance. The FIA also details what the state will
do (e.g. what type of support and how much will be provided) to assist the recipient in meeting
his/her FIA goals (Iowa Department of Human Services, 1996). Under FIP, the work and earn-
ings disregards are set at 50 percent of the family’s net earned income after deductions (down
from 100 percent). Also, higher levels of asset accumulation are allowed; and the period for
transition child-care support was lengthened. Assuming that the state has met its FIA stated ob-
ligations, benefits are terminated when the FIP recipient achieves self-sufficiency or the stated
time limit for FIP eligibility is reached.
Recipients who do not complete an FIA are considered to have chosen a Limited Benefit
Plan (LBP), a plan with penalties after the initial period of benefits. A recipient’s first LBP
lasts nine months. In the first three months of the LBP, FIP benefits are reduced by removing
the needs of the adult from the benefit determination calculation. Following this initial period,
the FIP recipient and his/her children are not eligible for FIP benefits for the next six months.
Subsequent LBPs are identical to the initial LBPs except that the initial three month reduced
benefit period is not invoked. That is, the LBP has a six-month period during which the recipi-
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ent and his/her children are not eligible for FIP benefits. Medicaid benefits may continue for
FIP recipients and families in an LBP.
Welfare Exiting and Recidivism
National studies, most conducted using data on conditions prior to “welfare reform,” show
that a substantial proportion of those who exited AFDC later returned. Meyer and Cancian
(1996) examine data from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79) and find
37 percent of women who exited returned within one year; 50 percent returned within two
years. Harris (1996) examines Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data and finds 27 per-
cent of the welfare exiters returned in one year; 42 percent returned within two years. Brandon
(1995) analyses data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). He finds
that post-program spells that ended with a return to AFDC lasted on average about 5.3 months.
Research shows that the probability of leaving public assistance varies by personal and
family characteristics. Factors associated with recidivism include having fewer years of educa-
tion, not being married, and having little job experience (Sandefur and Cook, 1997; Brandon,
1995). Cao’s (1996) analyses indicate that initial welfare dependency and recidivism are corre-
lated with the recipient’s age, years of education, marital status, ethnic origin, and region.
Born et al. (1998) provide a preliminary analysis of administrative data from the Maryland
Family Investment Program. Less than 20 percent of the cases were reopened within the first
three to six months post-exit. Reentry rates were lowest among women who exited for employ-
ment reasons. Born et al. also find that women whose exits were short-lived tended to have
younger children than those women who managed to stay off of the program.
Federal law now imposes a time limit on the receipts of TANF benefits, and mandates that
able-bodied welfare recipients should attempt to make the transition from welfare to work or
risk losing all or part of their benefits. Most studies of former welfare recipients have found
that between one-half and three-quarters of parents are employed shortly after they leave the
rolls (see Parrott 1998). However, wages are low, typically below $8 per hour and often below
$6 per hour. As a result, studies measuring earnings over three-month periods find the earnings
levels well below poverty level. Welfare demonstration project evaluations consistently find
that recipients earned an average of between $2,000 and $2,700 per quarter or between $8,000
and $10,800 annually.
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Role of Child Support
One premise of TANF is that single-parent families should not rely on public assistance for
long-term support. Rather, they should use welfare as a short-term income source. Economic
self-sufficiency should be achieved relatively quickly through a combination of wages and child
support (Roberts, 1998). The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) (1998) examined
whether or not families leaving welfare would have obtained child support income by the time
they reach their TANF time limit. In the first three states to enforce welfare benefit time limits,
Connecticut, Florida and Virginia, the GAO found that most families had no child support col-
lected for them by the states during the 12 months before their assistance was terminated.
When a child support order had been established and the support was collected, mean monthly
child support collected ranged from 22 percent to 60 percent of the mean welfare grant received
in the month before termination.
The GAO (1998) also looked at two states, Minnesota and Washington, with relatively high
performing child support programs and concluded that child support could be an important sup-
plement to the post-TANF income of families. However, unless states dramatically improve the
performance of their child support enforcement programs, it is unlikely that child support will be-
come such an income supplement. Brandon (1995) finds that former AFDC mothers who infre-
quently receive child support payments were more likely to return to the AFDC program.
Iowa’s Administrative Data
Iowa was one of the first states to link administrative data across programs to support pro-
gram administration and policy analysis for welfare and child support programs. In 1995, a
project was designed to develop administrative data systems for research purposes. The prod-
uct of this effort was a three-year (April 1993 - March 1996) longitudinal data file that matches
and merges FIP, Medicaid, Food Stamp Program (FSP), child support, and earnings records for
all FIP recipients during this period. These are the key assistance programs for low-income
families; child support and earnings are the key sources of nonpublic assistance income. These
data are specific as to amounts (e.g. program benefits, child support received, and earnings) and
dates (e.g. program exit and re-entry) and are preferred over survey data; they are not subject to
problems related to respondent recall and respondent bias. Therefore, the universe population
for this study is all FIP recipients. No samples were drawn for these analyses.
Innovation at the State Level: Initial Effects of Welfare Reform in Iowa / 11
During the study period, the overall caseload initially increased and then fell. The initial
caseload increases resulted from the more generous FIP income disregards and the stronger sup-
port programs that were introduced. The total FIP caseload and characteristics of the cases are
described in Table 1 for October 1993, October 1994, and October 1995. About 90 percent of
the active FIP cases received food stamps, and, as expected, almost all cases included house-
holds with children. Of these cases, 40 percent had a single adult and 87 percent of these were
female. Nearly 30 percent of the cases came from rural (adjacent or non-adjacent) areas. Adja-
cent rural (non-metropolitan) counties are adjacent to a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) or
have at least 2 percent of their employed labor force commuting to a metro county.
In this analysis, we focus on two aspects of welfare (FIP) participation: the time of exit and
the possible return. A welfare exit is defined as a case having been closed for two consecutive
months. More specifically, they are said to have left the FIP program if: (i) they received zero
dollars in FIP benefits in two consecutive months; (ii) the date of case termination indicates that
the case was terminated at the time they received zero benefits; and (iii) the case status code at
the time of termination indicates that the case was not pended, denied, or never opened. We fo-
cus on two periods of exit, October 1993 and October 1994, to have a 12-month post-exit obser-
vation period. Given that the exit month is October, the FIP exits include those who were FIP
active in August and inactive either in September and October or in October and November.
Although the Iowa linked data set includes detailed information on child support collec-
tions, FSP participation, and quarterly wage earnings, many of the demographic variables have
missing values. Specifically, nearly 60 percent of the cases had missing data. Because the sam-
ple size would be reduced significantly by deleting observations with missing data, we chose
instead to preserve all observations by creating a dummy variable for each demographic vari-
able that had missing values.
The analytical data set includes data from welfare recipients who left FIP in either October
1993 or October 1994. The total number of observations, from both exit periods, is 8,063. Ta-
ble 2 shows the listing of variables used for analysis and descriptive statistics.
Household and demographic variables include educational attainment, age, martial status,
and the presence of young children. Because earnings data are available only on a quarterly ba-
sis, we measure total earnings and total child support by quarter. On average, FIP exiters had
wage earnings of $3,000 per quarter, and child support collections of $200 per quarter. The lo-
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cation by county, although not an ideal indicator of job opportunities, is used to evaluate rural/
urban differences in FIP program use.
Methods of Analysis
The goal of the recent welfare reform is to help welfare recipients achieve self-sufficiency.
It is important to identify the main factors that keep welfare recipients off public assistance.
Initial descriptive analyses clarify the measures to use for evaluating the effects of the program
and labor market. These analyses also provide information on cross-program linkages and other
program effects over time.
The analyses of FIP recidivism make use of single equation estimates of factors associated
with program participation and exit decisions. A multivariate probit model is used to examine a
set of household and program related effects on participation. The general equation is of the
form:
Yit = b0 + b1 Xit + b2F + uit
where Yit is a program participation indicator; Xit is a vector of exogenous variables; F is a vec-
tor of related program parameters; and uit is an appropriately defined error term. The exoge-
nous variables include individual variables, such as education and marital status, family compo-
sition, labor variables (wage earnings), and rural/urban (metro) location. The program parame-
ters include participation (or benefit levels) in other programs. The dependent variable is a bi-
nary variable defined in terms of whether the household stayed off of FIP (i.e., “welfare”),
given that the household had left FIP in October (1993 or 1994). Here, two periods of time off
of FIP are considered: staying off at least 6 months and staying off at least 12 months.
FIP eligibility is mainly determined by household income. To account for income varia-
tions and multiple FIP reentry over time, total child support collections and total wage income
in the past 6 and 12 months, respectively, were used in the Probit models. We expect that lower
total child support collections and wage income will increase the probability of returning to FIP
in 6 and 12 months.
Food stamp program participation is closely tied to FIP eligibility. FIP benefit recipients
usually receive FSP benefits as well as FIP. However, the FSP also provides a safety net for
those who leave the FIP. Those who leave FIP may qualify for food stamps on the basis of low
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income. We expect participation in the FSP to be negatively related to the probability of stay-
ing off FIP, since FSP participation is an indicator of continued need for social support.
Among the demographic and household variables, we expect married families to have more
economic resources and, therefore, the ability to stay off FIP longer. Because both educational
attainment and area of residence are related to employment opportunity, we expect FIP recipi-
ents with a high school degree or living in metropolitan counties to be able to find jobs more
easily and, as a result, be less likely to return to FIP.
Two selection biases may occur because the observations include only FIP exits. The first
selection bias comes from self-selection into FIP in August. The second bias is the result of
welfare recipients choosing to leave FIP in October. Heckman’s (1978) two-stage procedure
was used to test the existence of both selection biases. Two Probit regressions were conducted
to compute the selection corrections (inverse Mill’s ratios). The first Probit estimates the prob-
ability of being FIP active in August of 1993 or August of 1994. The second Probit model pre-
dicts the probability of leaving FIP in October of 1993 or October of 1994. The independent
variables for the selection equations include the age, gender, ethnicity, marital status, and edu-
cation level of the FIP case head; the presence of children younger than three years in the
household; the local unemployment rate, and the household’s location of residence (metro
county, urban non-metro county, rural-adjacent county, and rural non-adjacent county).
Results
Tables 3 and 4 provide information on earnings, food stamp participation, and child sup-
port collections during the period following the exit for those who left FIP in either October
1993 or October 1994. Transitions are illustrated for those who leave and return within six
months (Table 3) and those who stay out for at least 12 months (Table 4).
For those who left in October 1993 or 1994, nearly 16 percent returned within six months.
As indicated in Table 3, the first quarter off of FIP was a difficult one: income and child support
collections dropped significantly. Concurrently, FSP benefits increased. More than 70 percent
of the cases were receiving food stamps.
Nearly 73 percent of those leaving FIP remained off for at least 12 months (Table 4).
Unlike those who returned to FIP in six months, people staying off FIP for 12 months continued
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to have higher wage earnings and child support collections following their exit. Their quarterly
wage earnings were nearly $1,000 more than those reported by people returning to FIP in six
months; their child support collections were more than double. This shows the important role
of earnings and child support in reducing recidivism. The lower percentage of reporting wage
earnings in Table 4 suggests that people staying off FIP for 12 months hold better paying jobs.
Among those staying off FIP for 12 months, the percentage reporting food stamp participation
is considerably smaller than for those returning within 6 months, and the percentage declines
over time. About 17 percent of the cases staying off of FIP for 12 months are in the food stamp
program following exit. These findings suggest important differences in the mix of FIP cases.
Those returning to FIP within six months often remained on FSP and were unable to fully make
the transition. For these households especially, the food stamp program provides a safety net
during transitions and times of economic hardship.
For the multivariate analysis, three models were estimated. Model 1 does not consider se-
lection bias; Model 2 only controls for the self-selection into FIP in August (estimated over all
FIP cases both active and former); while Model 3 controls for both self-selection into FIP in
August and exit in October. We also deleted observations with missing marital status and eth-
nic origin. Consequently, the number of observations is reduced to 7316. Overall, the models
performed well in terms of statistical significance, and most of the variables had the expected
sign and were statistically significant. For the selection correction terms, only the first selection
(Model 2) was statistically significant, which suggests the existence of selection bias for FIP
participation. Only results for Models 1 and 2 are presented here, in Tables 5 and 6. The dis-
cussion focuses on Model 2.
The results for FIP leavers out at least 6 months, and for those out at least 12 months were
similar in sign and level of significance. There are some differences in magnitude of several of
the estimated coefficients. Among the economic/income variables, both wage income and child
support had a positive and statistically significant effect on staying off of public assistance. The
statistical significance of child support income indicates the importance of this source of in-
come to these low income families. Food stamp assistance (quarters of receipt) is negatively
associated with being able to stay off of FIP. Those less successful in staying off make greater
use of food stamps, and the negative effect is stronger for those less able to stay off (6 months
versus 12 months).
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As expected, age (younger than 21) and the presence of young children had a negative ef-
fect on being able to stay off FIP. Being married, had no effect on the probability of staying off
FIP for 6 months, but significantly increased the probability of staying off FIP for 12 months.
Educational attainment (having a high school degree) is associated with human capital, training,
and having job market skills. Hence, as expected, having a high school degree increased the
probability of staying off FIP, although it is not statistically significant. The coefficient of the
indicator of missing education is positive, but not statistically significant. Living in a metro
area, which indicates more job opportunities, increases the probability of staying off FIP. The
average county unemployment rate and being married are not statistically significant.
The coefficients in Tables 5 and 6 are used to calculate the marginal effect of the variables
on the probability of staying off of FIP. The probability was evaluated at the values of sample
means. A thousand dollar increase in the average quarterly wage income increases the probabil-
ity of staying off FIP for 6 months by 0.005 and for 12 months by 0.06. On the other hand, in-
creasing the average quarterly child support by $1,000 will increase the probability of staying
off of FIP for 6 months by 0.16 and for 12 months by 0.25. An additional quarter spent in par-
ticipating in food stamps decreases the probability of staying off of FIP for 6 months by 0.15
and for 12 months by 0.14. The marginal effect of holding a high school degree or above on the
probabilities of staying off FIP for 6 months is 0.02 and for 12 months is 0.03. These results
indicate also the relative importance of employment and child support for longer term exits.
Conclusions
The success of PRWORA requires putting people to work, and obtaining a secure income
source for former welfare recipients. The Iowa experience with the FIP program has been rela-
tively successful in supporting the transition of those leaving the program. Almost three fourths
(73 percent) of those leaving the program remained off for at least 12 months. The results in
this paper confirm that income is a key determinant of participation and ability to stay off pub-
lic assistance programs. People who stay remain off FIP for 12 months have higher quarterly
wages and child support collections than those who stay off FIP for only 6 months or less.
The food stamp program functions as a safety net against economic downturns and indeed
is an important income source for FIP exiters. The majority of people who left FIP and re-
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turned within 6 months continued to participate in the food stamp program compared to only 15
percent of those staying off for 12 months. These findings, and the multivariate results, indicate
that those who are able to successfully make the transition off welfare programs rely less on
food stamp program support. However, even for these households, the FSP is important to their
transition in the first quarter off, and, for 15 percent of the households leaving FIP, it provides
support that is likely to be very important in keeping families off FIP. Child support is an im-
portant supplement for low-income families. The establishment and enforcement of child sup-
port obligations can potentially reduce the FIP caseload, as well.
The success of moving people out of FIP in the long run requires finding low-income indi-
viduals a stable job and higher paid work. The debate over recent welfare reforms has focused
mainly on the issue of whether welfare recipients can find and stay in jobs for the long term.
As long as the majority of people on public assistance have education at less than high school
level and lack work experience, it will be difficult to move them out of welfare without provid-
ing necessary support such as job training and formal schooling. Furthermore, many low-
income families are likely to face problems in the labor market because of lack of transportation
and child care. The challenge in rural areas is even greater because welfare recipients face a la-
bor market that is dispersed over a large geographic area and they require reliable private trans-
portation. Innovative public programs may be required to provide services in transportation and
child care to help low income families successfully achieve self-sufficiency. The experience in
Iowa provides early evidence on what is a national experiment in alternative approaches to wel-
fare reform.
Finally, this study demonstrates that state program data can be used for research. Experi-
ence drawn from administrative data such as the data used here can provide useful information
to policymakers at both the state and federal level. We believe that the wealth of program-
specific information available in state case files provides an excellent opportunity for analyses
to complement the survey-based research traditionally undertaken by social scientists.
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Oct. 1993 Oct. 1994 Oct. 1995
Demographic Variables Cases ( percent) Cases ( percent) Cases ( percent)
Total Caseloads 38632 39917 35509
On Food Stamp Program (0.89) (0.89) (0.88)
Number of Children
No Child (0.01) (0.007) (0.007)
One Child (0.35) (0.35) (0.35)
Two Children (0.32) (0.31) (0.31)
More Than Two Children (0.32) (0.333) (0.333)
Area of Residence
Metro (0.53) (0.53) (0.53)
Urban Non-metro (0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
Rural Adjacent (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Rural Non-adjacent (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Earnings and Child Support
Family Had Wage Earnings (0.58) (0.65) (0.68)
Family Received Child Support (0.22) (0.23) (0.22)
Number of Adults
No Adult (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
One Adult Case (0.41) (0.39) (0.39)
Two Adults Case (0.34) (0.35) (0.35)
More Than Two Adults Case (0.24) (0.25) (0.25)
Gender
Male (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Female (0.87) (0.87) (0.87)
Ethnicity
White (0.78) (0.78) (0.78)
Black (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Others (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Missing (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Age of Case Head
Younger Than 18 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Between Age 18 and 21 (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Older Than 21 (0.91) (0.93) (0.93)
Educational Attainment
High School, GED, or Above (0.28) (0.30) (0.26)
Less Than High (0.19) (0.15) (0.17)
Unknown and Missing (0.53) (0.55) (0.57)
Age of Youngest Child
No Children (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Younger Than 1 (0.18) (0.17) (0.17)
Between 1 and 3 (0.26) (0.25) (0.25)
Between 3 and 6 (0.22) (0.24) (0.24)
Older Than 6 (0.33) (0.33) (0.33)
Table 1: FIP caseloads by demographic variables : October 1993, October 1994, and October 1995
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Table 2: Characteristics of those with exit, sample means, and standard deviation
Staying off FIP for 6 months (0,1) 0.84 (0.368)
Staying off FIP for 12 months (0,1) 0.73 (0.447)
White (0,1) 0.785 (0.411)
Black (0,1) 0.084 (0.277)
Male (0,1) 0.167 (0.373)
Married (0,1) 0.286 (0.452)
Case Head Younger Than 21 Years Old (0,1) 0.09 (0.292)
Children Younger Than 3 Years Old (0,1) 0.419 (0.493)
Less Than High School Degree (0,1) 0.149 (0.356)
Living in Metro Counties (0,1) 0.491 (0.50)
Living in Urban-nonadjacent Counties (0,1) 0.174 (0.379)
Living in Rural-adjacent Counties (0,1) 0.154 (0.361)
Number of Quarters Participating in Food Stamp Program
in the Past 6 Months 0.533 (0.795)
Number of Quarters Participating in Food Stamp Program
in the Past 12 Months 1.065 (1.477)
Average Wage Income Received in the Past 6 Months
(in Thousands) 3.011 (3.575)
Average Wage Income Received in the Past 12 Months
(in Thousands) 3.124 (3.562)
Average Child Support Received in the Past 6 Months 392.01 (821.72)
Average Child Support Received in the Past 12 Months 841.29 (1653.41)
Average Local Unemployment Rate in the Past 6 Months 4.025 (1.062)
Average Local Unemployment Rate in the Past 12 Months 3.738 (0.93)
Marital Status Missing (0,1) 0.088 (0.283)
Education Missing (0,1) 0.57 (0.495)
Race Missing (0,1) 0.084 (0.278)
Number of Observations 8063
Variable Mean (Standard Deviation)
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Demographic Variables Oct.-Dec. Jan.-Mar. April-June July-Sept.
Income
Mean Income (Sum of Wage Earnings
and Child Support)
3,072 2,307 2,873 3,251
Share of Child Support 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12
Percentage with Wage Earnings 0.76 0.72 0.74 0.76
Mean Earnings for Those with Wage
Earnings 3,824 3,095 3,728 4,114
Food Stamp (FS) Program
Percentage with Food Stamp Benefits 0.45 0.71 0.59 0.65
Mean FS Benefits for Those with FS
Benefits 443 542 588 564
Child Support
Percentage Received Child Support 0.29 0.29 0.31 0.31
Mean Child Support Collections for
Those with Child Support 524 255 329 398
Table 3: FIP exits in October 1993 or October 1994, with returned to FIP in 6 Months by
demographic characteristics
Total FIP Exits Returning in 6 Months 1,304
Total FIP Exits in October 8,063
Percentage of Returning to FIP in 6 Months 0.16
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Demographic Variables Oct.-Dec. Jan.-Mar. April-June July-Sept.
Income
Mean Income (Sum of Wage Earnings
and Child Support) 3,444 3,177 3,546 3,692
Share of Child Support 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.14
Percentage with Wage Earnings 0.70 0.67 0.68 0.69
Mean Earnings for Those with Wage
Earnings 4,639 4,407 4,795 4,997
Food Stamp (FS) Program
Percentage with Food Stamp Benefits 0.21 0.17 0.15 0.14
Mean FS Benefits for Those with FS
Benefits 425 415 427 416
Child Support
Percentage Received Child Support 0.30 0.30 0.34 0.32
Mean Child Support Collections for
Thosewith Child Support 702 727 848 760
Table 4: FIP exits in Oct. 1993 or Oct. 1994 and stayed off of FIP for 12 Months by
demographic characteristics
Total FIP Exits Staying off for 12 Months 5,838
Total FIP Exits in October 8,063
Percentage of Staying off FIP for 12
Months 0.73
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Independent Variables Model 1
(S.D.)
Model 2
(S.D.)
Average Quarterly Wage Incomes in 6 Months 0.022***
(0.006)
0.023***
(0.007)
Average Quarterly Child Support Collections in 6 Months 0.664***
(0.063)
0.677***
(0.063)
Number of Quarters Participating in Food Stamp Program
in 6 Months
-0.652***
(0.02)
-0.649***
(0.022)
Case Head Younger Than 21 Years Old (Dummy) -0.188***
(0.066)
-0.249***
(0.074)
Children Younger Than 3 Years Old (Dummy) -0.145***
(0.04)
-0.137***
(0.040)
Living in the Metro County (Dummy) 0.158***
(0.042)
0.164***
(0.043)
Married 0.049
(0.042)
0.037
(0.043)
Less Than High School Degree (Dummy) -0.078
(0.056)
-0.071
(0.057)
Education Missing (Dummy) 0.053
(0.045)
0.044
(0.045)
Average Unemployment Rate in 6 Months 0.029
(0.02)
0.030
(0.020)
Correction for Being FIP Active in Aug. 1993 or Aug. 1994 0.108**
(0.05)
Intercept 1.137***
(0.105)
1.031***
(0.119)
Chi-square Statistics 1028.16 1031.62
Degree of Freedom 10 11
Number of Observations 7,316 7,316
Table 5: Probability of staying off FIP for at least 6 months, given that the case had left FIP in
either October 1993 or October 1994
Standard deviation is in the parentheses.
*** Significant at 1 percent level.
** Significant at 5 percent level.
* Significant at 10 percent level.
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Independent Variables Model 1
(S.D.)
Model 2
(S.D.)
Average Quarterly Wage Incomes in 12 Months 0.015***
(0.006)
0.017***
(0.006)
Average Quarterly Child Support Collections
in 12 Months
0.691***
(0.052)
0.717***
(0.052)
Number of Quarters Participating in Food Stamp
Program in 12 Months
-0.409***
(0.011)
-0.405***
(0.011)
Case Head Younger Than 21 Years Old (Dummy) -0.181***
(0.06)
-0.285***
(0.067)
Children Younger Than 3 Years Old (Dummy) -0.177***
(0.036)
-0.164***
(0.036)
Living in the Metro County (Dummy) 0.119***
(0.038)
0.130***
(0.038)
Married 0.129***
(0.038)
-0.107***
(0.039)
Less Than High School Degree (Dummy) -0.083
(0.052)
-0.072
(0.052)
Education Missing (Dummy) 0.044
(0.04)
0.027
(0.041)
Average Unemployment Rate in 12 Months 0.012
(0.02)
-0.014
(0.020)
Correction for Being FIP Active in Aug. 1993 or
Aug. 1994
0.187***
(0.052)
Intercept 0.877***
(0.098)
0.69***
(0.112)
Chi-square Statistics 1616.78 1629.59
Degree of Freedom 10 11
Number of Observations 7,316 7,316
Table 6: Probability of staying off FIP for 12 Months, given that the case had left FIP in
either October 1993 or October 1994
Standard deviation is in the parentheses.
*** Significant at 1 percent level.
** Significant at 5 percent level.
* Significant at 10 percent level.
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